Introduction

President Trump’s return to power following the 2024 US elections has destabilized NATO and has weakened Europe’s security apparatus. The strongest ally and protector of the European continent is no longer dependable. President Trump and members of his National Security Council have used antagonistic rhetoric toward the United States’ longstanding allies in the United Kingdom and there has been very good cause for concern about the integrity of the American Intelligence Community in its capacity, or perhaps willingness, to protect information from adversaries.

In response to the dubious foreign policy of the American government, European Union member-states have been voicing a desire to promote European independence in the security and military sectors, seeking to break its reliance on American funding and materiel. A potential plan that has been pitched in years past has been making a return to the negotiating table on the European continent – a European Army. The idea of a unified European force has existed for the majority of the postwar era. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration had convinced most of the major European powers that the continent needed a unified military force, save for the French government (Bergmann, 2025). Eisenhower had also envisioned a Europe that was politically aligned and unified under one governing body to create an entity that he referred to as a “United States of Europe” (de Gruyter, 2025). He believed a united Europe was the key to achieving global stability and security (ibid).

European leaders have called for a continental army over the years as well. Jean Monnet, the architect behind the European Coal and Steel Community – a precursor to what would become the EU – proposed the creation of the European Defense Community in response to the United States’s call to rearm Germany at the outbreak of the Korean War. This plan failed to come to fruition due to a lack of member-state support and growing NATO strength (Wallenfeldt, 2023). In the 1990s, there was division among the power European states of Germany, France, and the UK on defense policy. The UK favored a close partnership with the Americans while Germany and France desired a Eurocentric military force separate from the US and from NATO. The Petersberg Tasks were born out of the debates of the early 1990s, outlining the purposes for which military units could be deployed as ordered by the European Union forms a major piece of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in Europe (Publications Office of the European Union, 2017). The CSDP, established in 1999, has been responsible for 36 operations launched and run by the EU as of 2020. Decision-making for these operations is up to the European Council, with both civilian and military forces made up of personnel provided by member-states (B2EU Consulting, 2020). This mechanism still falls short of a cohesive military unit and relies on the bureaucracy of the European Council and a force put together by member-states in a piecemeal fashion.

This paper will attempt to identify prominent obstacles that have stood in the way of a cohesive European army and present actionable policy recommendations for the European Union to take in to enhance European security and solidify its independence from the United States.

Impetus for A European Army

Before identifying roadblocks to developing a European force and possible solutions to remedy them, it is important to first decide whether there is any reason for such an entity. This paper operates on the assumption that there is a need for a unified European Army. It is the opinion of the author that there is good reason for it to exist.

The largest geopolitical hurdle facing the European continent is that of the Russian Federation. Under President Putin, it exists as an aggressive power straddling both the European and Asian continents. It has a history of bullying weaker states that it deems to be within its traditional sphere of influence, seen with its 2008 invasion of Georgia and de facto annexation of South Ossetia and its aggressive and unlawful war against Ukraine starting with the annexation of Crimea and portions of the Donbas in 2014 and a full-scale invasion in 2022.

Given Putin’s lack of regard for international law and state sovereignty, it is reasonable to treat him as a hostile actor and one to be regarded with extreme caution. The Baltic and Nordic states that share a border with Russia have voiced strong support for Ukraine and have been pushing for more attention to be focused on NATO’s Eastern Flank. The Baltic states have been faced with Russian pressure for years now and view Ukraine as a European state that is all that stands between the rest of the continent and further encroachment into the continent (Kishinevskiy et al, 2025).

Poland, a key player in Eastern European geopolitics and the largest military power in the EU, has been calling for an increase in military spending for all NATO member-states while pledging to bump its own spending up to 5% of its GDP in 2025 (Laskowska, 2025). Poland has been a key contributor to Ukraine’s defense effort and has announced a plan to train every adult male for war, albeit on a voluntary basis. The mindset among the Polish people and government is to make the state and population ready for a potential Russian invasion (Kosc, 2025). By the end of 2026, Poland plans to have 100,000 people trained to be available reservists in the event of a Russian invasion. Former Deputy Chief to the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces is explicitly warning of a potential invasion as early as the end of 2025 or the beginning of 2026 (ibid­). Whether that comes to be true is another debate entirely, but it does help to illuminate the sentiment and rationale behind Poland’s preparations. Russia is viewed as an aggressor on the continent and states along NATO’s Eastern Flank feel a strong need to project strength and unity to serve as effective deterrence against a potential Russian onslaught.

Coupled with Russia’s aggression is the current American president ridiculing NATO allies, flirting with Vladimir Putin, and strongly suggesting a willingness to take over Greenland (a part of NATO member Denmark) with military force if necessary. The United States is historically Europe’s largest protector and guarantor against the Russian threat and is the implacable backbone of the NATO alliance. Without the support of the United States, NATO stands to lose a core piece of its financial and military strength. As of December 2024, the US is the largest direct contributor, along with Germany, providing almost 16% of NATO’s running costs (NATO, 2024). Since President Trump has returned to power, he and his senior officials have been very vocal in their desire to see Europe carry the mantle of responsibility in providing for their own defense without requiring assistance from the United States. He has suggested that the US may not protect it’s NATO allies and ignore Article 5 if he felt that they were not doing enough to pay for their own defense (Erlanger, 2025). Trump has demonstrated a transactional nature in his foreign policy actions thus far, wielding intelligence sharing and aid to Ukraine as leverage to bring President Volodymyr Zelensky to the negotiating table with Russia on Trump and Putin’s terms (Klepper and Superville, 2025). He has also demonstrated inconsistent messaging in his economic policies, threatening to impose tariffs against Canada, Mexico, and the EU only to then delay their implementation after garnering concessions from the targeted states – which tend to be longstanding partners.

There is now reason to doubt the integrity of the American Intelligence Community. On March 24, 2025, Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic made the world aware that he was added to a group thread on the messaging app Signal along with high-ranking US officials to the likes of Vice President JD Vance, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. Classified plans (or, at least plans that ought to have been classified) and real-time updates of US airstrikes in Yemen were discussed on an unsecure platform outside of official channels with a reporter present (Goldberg and Harris, 2025). The addition of Goldberg was unbeknownst to the officials in the thread, suggesting a lack of awareness and a lack of attention to detail among the top ranks of the American security apparatus. Such an outlandish occurrence begs the question of the capacity of the United States to be a viable and dependable ally and whether European NATO members can share military intelligence with the Americans with confidence that the information will not make its way to unintended recipients. Additionally, it could be assumed that highly sensitive discussions are being routinely held on such unsecure platforms by members of the American intelligence community. Such a security risk may be intolerable to European allies and prompt EU states to keep intelligence out of American hands for this reason. Simply put, the United States does not present as a reliable security partner for the long-term. If there is question to whether the US will come to a NATO ally’s defense should they be attacked by Russia, then the alliance no longer serves a purpose. EU security traditionally has been derived from its association with NATO, but now it may be best developed from within the EU itself.

Roadblocks

The modern iteration of the EU is based on the Treaty of the European Union, which does have a modest provision for common defense in Article 42. However, this provision recognizes other security policies held by NATO member-states and notes that the Treaty on the European Union will not jeopardize such policies and obligations (Treaty on the European Union, 1992).

Creating a unified EU military force will require states to come to political compromises and agreements with one another. If all EU member-states are to form this military force to start, then it will require an agreement between all 27 states, including officially neutral Ireland, Austria, and Malta. Crises in the EU’s recent memory can highlight where different perspectives have sparked divisions between EU member-states. The influx of migrants from Syria and Afghanistan in 2015 and 2016 saw countries such as Germany and Sweden welcome newcomers with open arms. Central European powers that have been traditionally closed off looked to block immigrants from getting into their territory (Lehne, 2022). States that were on the southern border of the EU and were receiving the brunt of migrants coming across the Mediterranean felt that there was a lack of solidarity among EU states in tackling the crisis, while Northern European countries that were farther from the front lines accused those on the southern border of not living up to their obligations under the Dublin Regulation and failing to process the asylum requests of refugees in their respective countries (ibid).

COVID-19 was another crisis that the EU attempted to tackle but failed to do so in a cohesive manner. The virus caused firmer border policies between the member-states and individual governments worked against one another in a competition for resources (Lehne, 2022). There were contradictory public health policies enacted among neighboring member-states and divisions between Northern and Southern EU members began to rise in attempting to develop a response to the stumbling EU economy (ibid).

The effects of these crises were felt across the EU and affected individual citizens’ sentiment toward their respective states’ participation in the Union. There has been a notable rise in the prevalence far-right, nationalist politics in EU states such as Germany, with the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party achieving its best result to date in the recent snap elections held in February 2025 (Reuters, 2025). Hungary remains firmly under the rule of Viktor Orban and his right-wing party Fidesz. Orban as the Prime Minister of Hungary has overseen a nationalist and anti-EU platform, capitalizing on the anti-immigrant sentiment among the public in 2015 and 2016. Orban has strongly asserted state control over the press and has used it to his political advantage in driving his political platforms while snuffing avenues for the opposition to do the same, calling this increasingly authoritarian system of government an “illiberal democracy” (Britannica, 2025). Orban has stood by his relationship with President Putin during the Russo-Ukrainian War, refusing to allow materiel to be sent through Hungarian territory, though he did not oppose EU sanctions against Russia (ibid). In France, the right-wing nationalist party Rassemblement Nationale (RN) notched the most seats in the 2024 European Parliament elections (Baxter, 2024). Like Fidesz and AfD, RN stands on anti-EU and anti-immigration platforms. Its performance in the European Parliament elections, along with the performance of right-wing parties across the EU, have set the stage for an incoherent legislative body that may fundamentally disagree on measures that require a unified political will among EU member-states. Political disunity will be a challenge in implementing a standing European Army to deter a looming Russia and fill the gap in the defense apparatus left by an unreliable United States.

Another core issue standing in the way of a unified European military force is interoperability. 27 nation-states would need to mesh their forces together into a cohesive unit with a consistent command structure, military doctrine, and training program. Interoperability struggles within NATO can foreshadow some of the difficulties in attempting to establish a diverse force. It must be acknowledged that NATO is inherently different from this hypothetical European Army in that NATO is a force where individual member-states contribute their own personnel and materiel to NATO to be used for potential operations on a voluntary basis. The alliance itself does not have a standing military force (NATO, 2024). This European Army, for the purposes of this paper and based on past propositions, would be a standing force dedicated to the defense of the continent under a command independent of respective sovereign states. However, since it will involve multiple countries, many of which are NATO members, it is reasonable to look to interoperability issues among such states to identify potential roadblocks to a European force.

NATO has been subject to differences between its member-states due to multiple disputes. Türkiye and Greece, for example, have been locked in a back-and-forth over maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean near Cyprus. Türkiye has at times leaned closer to Russia than with NATO as well, posing a chink in the armor of unity in the alliance (Harikumar, 2022). Türkiye’s past deference to Russia has prompted the United States to act as well, boxing the state out of the F-35 fighter jet program in 2019 after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a deal to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems (Mehta, 2019). Though Türkiye is not an EU member, it is in a crucial geographical position in containing Russian aggression, controlling access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. Such differences between states may not easily subside.

Creating a cohesive military force would require weapons and munition standardization among the involved states and training its forces to use such weapons and vehicles. There are a variety of standard infantry riles used by individual EU militaries today, such as the G36 in Germany and the FAL in Belgium. Main battle tanks range from the French Leclerc to the British Challenger 2. Mastering all systems would require massive amounts of training and time, no easy feat as demonstrated by the time it took the Ukrainian Army to become adapted to the sophisticated M1 Abrams (Toropin, 2023). To form a cohesive fighting force, standardization of equipment and training will be a necessity and will not be easily overcome.

The United Kingdom is not a part of the EU, nor is Türkiye. The UK is a nuclear power with an experienced and effective military and intelligence apparatus. If a European Army is to come to fruition, it is crucial that the UK be among its participants. Having an additional nuclear power will serve as further deterrence to Russian aggression and will provide additional security in Northern Europe. Türkiye, as previously stated, is in a pivotal position to enhance containment of Russia and seal off the Mediterranean from Russian naval vessels. Turkish involvement would be a great asset to the goal of European security. Political hurdles in involving non-EU members in an EU-based military will need to be addressed. There is precedent for an EU partnership with the Turks, seen in the European Union-Türkiye Customs Union partnership. Additionally, the EU views its Turkish neighbor as a “key strategic partner” (EEAS, 2021). The UK has been involved in CSDP operations in the past, and there is a precedent for military cooperation between the two. However, the UK’s role has been in a limited, non-decision making capacity as it is not a member of the EU (von Ondarza et al, 2025). There also exists economic cooperation between the two parties in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement which goes “beyond traditional free trade agreements” and enhances economic ties between the two parties (European Commission, n.d.).

Political and logistical difficulties stand in the way of achieving cohesion in a European Army. These challenges are not to be taken lightly and they will require intense deliberation among EU states to overcome them. However, there are actions that can be taken to tackle such issues.

Policy Proposals

If the European Army is to be independent of EU member-states and take on a supranational model, it will need to be held accountable by bodies of the EU itself. Thus, the European Parliament will need to be granted expanded powers to deal in defense matters of the EU, similar to the US Congress having the authority to declare war. The existing EU legal framework and respective national constitutions place the burden of territorial defense on individual states. The EU is not responsible for providing such defense in its present iteration. There is precedent for supranational action being taken by the EU in times of crisis. The EU was able to borrow funds to tackle economic challenges posed by COVID-19 in a combination of intergovernmental and supranational elements (Meijer and Klein, 2025). Such action would need to be taken to allow the European Parliament to oversee a defense budget and EU deployments. It is imperative that the European Parliament exercise authority over the military force to preserve democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, the EU lacks a permanent military command structure. There are cooperations and partnerships that exist, such as the previously mentioned CSDP, but to command an independent force will require the creation of a European Department of Defense to the effect that a cohesive military bureaucracy and command structure is established. Such a body will be more effective the standardization of training and equipment as well as overall command of the force itself.

Third-party agreements will need to be created or expanded with non-EU states that are vital to European security. These states include the UK and Türkiye. These agreements will need to encapsulate comprehensive military cooperation and political cooperation with the European Parliament. States involved in the European Army would need to have decision-making powers in how the force is utilized and what it prioritizes.

To ensure unity in the EU and avoid certain member-states from taking on the brunt of providing for this military force, mandatory participation would need to be implemented. This would include constitutionally neutral EU states and antagonistic ones. Hungary will likely present as an antagonistic element to an increase in the power of the EU. Voting rights could be suspended for Hungary under Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union. The idea of this action has been floated after numerous blocks by Hungary in renewing sanctions against Russia its aggressive war. This leverage could be used against Orban to garner Hungarian participation and to stabilize the credibility of the EU. To convince constitutionally neutral states to join the EU force, diplomacy would need to take center stage. These states would need to be assured that the European Army would not be used for offensive purposes and would only be mobilized in the face of an imminent threat to the European continent. Accommodations could be made where neutral states provide personnel and materiel that be used in non-combat roles such as logistics or medical fields. Additionally, the force should be pitched as a means to strengthen the negotiating position of the EU and raise its standing on the international stage. A stronger EU serves to better protect the neutral states.

To fund the creation of the European Army, a model similar to that of NATO could be implemented. A percentage of the GDP from each state would be allocated to an established EU Defense Fund. This would ensure that all states are paying what they can into their common defense without crushing smaller economies under the weight of defense spending. Larger countries would provide more spending, however they would already be compensated with larger representation in the European Parliament than their smaller partners, having more influence in the directives of the European Army.

Conclusion

The author acknowledges that identifying possible policies to implement a European Army is entirely different than going through the strenuous work of legally implementing them. Establishing such a force would require years, if not decades, of negotiations, diplomacy, and compromises. Ultimate success rests on the political will within EU states to embark on this journey. It would require a massive mobilization of capital and people and the democratic support of the populations of the respective member-states. This paper did not intend to determine the likelihood of such an undertaking coming to fruition. Such an analysis will be reserved for future research. Other considerations include the establishment of a cohesive European intelligence apparatus or intelligence-sharing forum. Establishing a European Army may be in the best interest of enhancing European security, but that means nothing without the will of the 450 million people of the EU. Whether such a force is created or not, the precarious position of American support of NATO and its commitment to its European allies place the EU in a vulnerable position militarily and economically. Such threats will need to be addressed, but whether it is in the form of a continental force or enhanced intergovernmental cooperation similar to that of NATO remains to be seen. The security landscape is fluid and Russia is reliably antagonistic. These concerns will need to be addressed in some form in the near term. Time is of the essence for Europe.

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Ambassador Sullivan was the head of the US diplomatic mission to Russia from 2019 to 2022 and was in Moscow for the first months of the invasion of Ukraine. He draws on his experiences with Russian counterparts during his time as Deputy Secretary of State and his extensive knowledge of Russian history in culture that was born out of a personal interest and a passion for hockey to represent the United States Government and interests to the best of his ability in his tenure as Ambassador. The first few chapters of his memoir provide valuable insights on the machinations of the US State Department under President Trump to which he bore witness on his journey that would bring him to Spaso House, such as impromptu meetings and a somewhat porous administration when it came to keeping potential nominees close to the vest.

Ambassador Sullivan carefully articulates the way the mind of President Vladimir V. Putin works, noting his chekist mentality, imperial ambitions, and, above all, implacable animosity toward the United States. Ambassador Sullivan effectively demonstrates just how seemingly impossible diplomacy with President Putin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be but does not simply ridicule his Russian counterparts for it. Ambassador Sullivan acknowledges the rationale behind President Putin’s decision-making and the impact the end of the Cold War had on the Russian identity. He understands and impresses upon the reader that the current state of affairs did not occur in a vacuum. He invokes American diplomatic stalwarts George Kennan and William Burns in his analysis of Russian history to provide an explanation for the sense of insecurity and lust for an imperial resurgence, creating context for the inevitable 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Ever a student of Russo-American relations and Russian society, Ambassador Sullivan had a firm grasp of what he could do to improve relations between the two powers. His emphasis on public diplomacy and repeated efforts to meet everyday Muscovites, sometimes at his own expense, provides a shining example of what an American ambassador should be at their core. He leveraged his passion for hockey and deep knowledge of Soviet national teams to connect with prominent Russian players and contemporary citizens. He was an exemplary representative of his country and his people.

Ever a patriotic American, he represented two presidents with a steadfast sense of duty and commitment. He studied and understood his counterparts, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov. Ambassador Sullivan approached each member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian state with cautious optimism, looking to determine who he could at least do business with while understanding how to command the respect of his Russian counterparts. To put it bluntly, Ambassador Sullivan was not going to be pushed around.

He valued each member of the US mission to Russia, both at Embassy Moscow and Consulates Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok, leading the staff through COVID-19, isolation, harassment from the FSB, and the onset of war. Sullivan’s Post 5 sounds like it would be the liveliest spot in any town. His commitment to morale would be inspirational for any aspiring Foreign Service Officer or young adult about to enter the workforce and is a lesson for any leader.

Ambassador Sullivan’s tenure exhibits sacrifice in service of one’s country in its true form. His most valued advisor was his wife, Grace Rodriguez. She counseled him on any career decision he made during his time in public service and was his most ardent supporter. His role as Ambassador and his time as the Deputy Secretary of State and positions in the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Justice meant a large amount of time was spent apart. Ambassador Sullivan was in Moscow for most of her final years before her unexpected death, which occurred under the shadow of Putin’s war.

His engaging style of writing – reading as almost a novelization of true events – allows him to effectively make the case for why the United States must support its allies and defend Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. He cites the prosecution of Nazis at Nuremburg, pulling from the arguments of the prosecutor based on rhetoric of the Nazi Party that preluded the annexations of the Sudetenland and Austria as well as the invasion of Poland. Ambassador Sullivan reminds the readers that the United States is the only state with the capacity to stand against Russian aggression and owes it to both its allies and its own people. He calls for Americans to pull together, invoking past generations’ sacrifices in two world wars.

Ambassador Sullivan’s actions and writing can stir up a sense of patriotism and unity that one may have forgotten during this divided period for the United States. He embodies what a representative of the United States can and should be. As a Bay Stater who loves his Dunkin’ and Red Sox, it gave me pride to read about another Bay Stater who represented our state and country with integrity. Anyone who places stock in such values should read this memoir and acknowledge the great lengths he took to maintain the viability of diplomacy all the way until February 24, 2022. Dealing with the Russians may not be easy, but reading this book sure is.

The Cold War, which dominated the latter half of the 20^th century, saw the US and Soviet Union battle each other through proxies and compete for global influence through the expansion of economic and military alliances. The military capabilities of both powers increased dramatically, while nuclear deterrence proved to be the most effective weapon between the warring ideologies of capitalism and communism.

The US and NATO prevailed in the Cold War and were temporarily victorious. However, they are now facing a familiar foe by a different name. China maintains and works to grow its nuclear arsenal. Russia is its strongest ally, and it is currently engaged in a war with Ukraine, backed by the West. China is Iran’s largest trade partner and has been a long-time ally to North Korea. China is rising to be the new leader of the eastern bloc to counter American influence, just as the Soviet Union once did. Its allies are engaged in or backing wars with Western-aligned states Ukraine and Israel.

In the modern Cold War, it is not a battle between capitalism and communism but between the desire for a unipolar world lead by American hegemony and the West and a multipolar world with several powers able to counteract American influence.

Chinese Expansion

The United States remains the ever-present leader of the West as it has since 1945. In the absence of the Soviet Union, China has risen to be the primary foil to American dominance. President Xi Jingping launched his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 with the goal of bringing most of the Asian continent into the Chinese sphere of influence with massive investments in infrastructure in Asian states. Ideally, the BRI would link Asia economically and physically via ports, highways, and shipping lanes. Project locations have since expanded into Africa, eastern Europe, Oceania, and South America. These have granted China economic access and influence across the globe and have provided a path to expansion in a manner that avoids the American military presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

In addition to an increasing economic presence on the global stage, China has flexed its military muscle with an increase in harassment of American and allied ships and aircraft in the Indo-Pacific region. Its rate of nuclear proliferation has increased in recent years as well, per Department of Defense (DOD) estimates. The DOD 2023 China Military Power Report finds a push for modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Already enjoying the world’s largest naval force in terms of total ships and submarines, the PLA has been improving its air and ground forces to be able to act in a more coordinated manner, a necessity in modern warfare.

American Response

In response to this Chinese military buildup, the US has focused on strengthening alliances with Indo-Pacific states and maintaining a basic posture of deterrence. The US has military installations in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and various Pacific islands such as Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. In 2023, the US has reaffirmed economic assistance agreements with Pacific states Palau and Micronesia (both formerly administered by the American government) and has signed a defense agreement with Papua New Guinea. This military presence, along with allied states, essentially acts as a geographical blockade against China in the Pacific and makes PLA naval movement difficult in the region.

Committing resources to the Pacific region that is perceived as beneficial by both parties will make more states in the area believe that the US is a viable and trustworthy partner. This notion will act as an effective counter to Chinese influence and will strengthen the overall American strategy of deterrence in its continued power struggle with China.

Taiwan

A direct war between the US and China would almost certainly mean a third world war due to NATO’s mutual defense clause. This notion alone will likely act as a force of deterrence for the two superpowers in addition to nuclear deterrence.

The primary hot button issue between the US and China remains the question of Taiwan sovereignty. China claims Taiwan as its own and has claimed that it will become a part of the PRC by 2050 and will use military force if necessary. The US has promised an armed response in the event of a Chinese invasion of the island. It is likely the two sides will not be able to agree on this issue. Taiwan is of the utmost strategic importance for both the US and China due to its proximity to the Chinese mainland and its role as the world’s producer of semiconductors. For one to cede Taiwan to the other would be a massive blow to the interests of the losing party and would grant the winner a definitive edge in future development of all things tech-related, from household appliances to 5^th generation fighter jets.

Taiwan falling to China would allow the PLA to establish a strong foothold in the Indo-Pacific region and would break through the de facto American naval blockade. If it is to remain separate from the PRC, then President Jingping would lose credibility in its military posturing and may not be perceived as quite a serious threat as he is now, and the PLA would remain hamstrung in its ability to effectively operate in the Indo-Pacific.

China’s Economic Woes

The Cold War of the 20^th century ended when the Soviet Union collapsed following an imploding economy that was riddled with corruption and mismanagement. It is unknown how this Cold War will end, but there are some indicators that point to a similar fall in the future.

China crashed onto the economic scene in the 1990s and quickly rose to become the second-largest economy in the world. However, this period of prosperity has shown signs of slowing down in 2023. Country Garden, one of the largest property developers, defaulted on two US dollar bonds. Zhongrong Trust, which was responsible for $87 billion worth of funds also failed to make good on several payments that amounted to $19 million. The worry is that these losses and defaults might roll over into other economic sectors and trigger a larger economic downturn.

In addition to a possible debt crisis, the Chinese population is aging and experienced a net loss in 2022. This trend is due to the family planning policies implemented in the late 20^th century that limited couples to having only one child and “gender-selective abortions” where male children were favored over female. As of 2021, there are 30 million more men than women in China. The Chinese economy relies on swaths of younger workers to power its manufacturing sector. A rapidly aging population will see the number of prospective workers dwindle and will place the viability of the manufacturing sector, and thus the Chinese economy as whole, in danger of a disaster.

The future of the Chinese superpower will hinge on how Beijing responds to this impending economic crisis. Should the CCP fail to respond effectively, this modern iteration of the Cold War will come to a similar end as that of its predecessor. For now, however, the US and China are locked in a competition for global influence.

Supporting Ukraine has now become a divisive issue in Congress. Some Republicans have come to view continued support as a waste of American dollars and military machinery and believe the Ukrainians – and by extent the rest of NATO – should be left to their own devices to handle the war on the European continent.

A looming government shutdown in September cast further doubt on the American ability to fund the war effort. These fears were briefly alleviated until Representative Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) was ousted as the Speaker of the House. This has left the congressional body unable to enact new legislation and approve further financial and military support of Ukraine, reinforcing the once unthinkable notion that the United States may not be able to carry out its role as leader of NATO and bring its immense power to the battlefield, albeit in weapons alone.

This week, Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) has lost two bids to become the next Speaker of the House. The House of Representatives is still without a leader, and therefore aid to Ukraine will continue to be halted.

During this internal turmoil, a new war broke out between Israel and Hamas. The United States has diverted much of its attention to this conflict, with President Biden visiting Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel on the 18^th of October in a show of solidarity and support. Two American carrier groups are now stationed in the eastern Mediterranean Sea as a deterrence to a possible invasion by Hezbollah from the north in Lebanon and a possible Iranian intervention on behalf of its long-time proxy in Gaza.

The United States now finds itself supporting two wars with a Congress that is unable to act. This premise is ideal for enemies of the United States and its allies.

President Vladimir Putin knows he can outlast the Ukrainian forces if they are not supported by NATO and has been quoted saying the Ukrainians would only last “a week” without Western support. Whether or not his timeframe is accurate, it is generally accepted that Western support is the one and only lifeline for Ukraine. The United States make up most of that support. Without the Americans, the other NATO states would be unable to fill the gap.

Israel, with a formidable military might and highly capable soldiers, is still bolstered by American funding and supplies. Israel’s enemies, such as Iran, know that a direct attack on Israel would draw the ire and possible armed response of the United States. Israel existing under this American umbrella has helped it grow and thrive and has helped to bring its Arab neighbors to the negotiating table to establish diplomatic relations.

It is this soft power that the United States possesses that makes it so powerful and such a dominant force in geopolitics.

This soft power works as a force of attraction and deterrence. It attracts states to come into its fold and join alliances such as NATO and enter into trade agreements. People flock to American borders because of its economic success and technological advances. Parents come with children to gain access to the American education system. American music and entertainment are consumed across all continents. States want to become allies with the Americans because it benefits them and because it is generally believed that the United States makes good on its promises.

These are not one-sided deals, however. The US gains strategic benefits from partnering with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Niger (before the summer coup), allowing American military bases to be established on Nigeran territory to make progress in the global War on Terror and oil to flow to the United States from the Arabian Peninsula.

American soft power protects itself and its allies through deterrence and can persuade potentially hostile states to come to the diplomatic table. Saudi Arabia has refused to recognize Israel but has been an ally to the United States. Since Israel and the US are linked, it would be beneficial to the Saudis to recognize the state of Israel, gaining concessions from the Americans in doing so and strengthening ties with the US having erased a large point of friction in the Saudi-American relationship. This idea not lost on the Saudis, a deal resulting in Saudi recognition of Israel was on the horizon before Hamas’s invasion of Israel halted talks. American leadership in the NATO alliance has been a counterweight to Russian military power, bringing more European states under its nuclear umbrella with the latest additions being Finland and Sweden in the last year which serves to weaken Russia’s influence on the continent and geographically backs it into a corner.

American allies exist with the guarantee of American support, and American enemies exist with the guarantee of a decisive American response should an encroachment occur on American or allied assets.

That guarantee, the cornerstone on which American foreign policy is built, is in jeopardy. The disarray in Congress has raised the possibility that the United States might not always be able to live up to its promises and come to the aid of its allies. The divide over Ukraine has split the once unified American voice. President Biden has promised aid will return to Ukraine once Congress has gotten its act together while members of that very body denounce the idea of further support of the Ukrainian cause. Trust in the American guarantee may be in doubt.

This schism in American politics has revealed a chink in the armor of the United States and its allies. The actions – or lack thereof – of Congress have a resounding impact on affairs abroad. A House divided is favorable to American enemies because it creates a disjointed United States distracted with internal squabbles and power struggles while wars erupt, and American allies are left exposed.

Congress does appear to be united behind Israel for the time being, but it has no ability to appropriate funds for the Israeli effort either. Until a Speaker is elected, future American support for Ukraine and Israel will be mostly words.

This is not to say that electing a Speaker will turn a magical faucet that pumps out aid Ukraine and Israel. Jim Jordan is a far-right member of Congress and staunch Trump ally who has voiced discontent with American aid to Ukraine. Agreements will still have to be made and bills will have to pass through an increasingly divided body. President Biden will need to reconcile his stance on Ukraine with the will of Congress. However, it will be the first step to aid resuming.

Going forward, the United States will need to ensure that its foreign policy and projection of power are certain. China has promised that Taiwan will become part of the mainland and would take it by force if necessary. The United States has promised an armed response should Taiwan be invaded. North Korea has launched missiles into the Sea of Japan and has worked to develop a nuclear arsenal, threatening American allies South Korea and Japan. A divided and weakened United States would embolden China and North Korea in their ambitions and would leave American allies in a precarious state. The soft power that the United States employs and enjoys would be diminished and alliances would be tested.

One war dragging out has led to a division in Congress and a strain on American foreign policy. It is unknown what the war in Israel will lead to or if it will expand into a regional conflict with an intervention by Hezbollah or Iran. If the United States and its allies are to prevail and maintain the current world order, Congress must become unified behind a foreign policy that keeps the American guarantee in place and keeps both allies and enemies assured of American security commitments.

Hamas won control of Gaza in 2007 and has since engaged in numerous conflicts with Israel, exchanging rockets and artillery. Iran has acted as a major supporter of the organization, providing financial backing as well as military hardware. Iran has provided rhetorical support as well, backing the Palestinian movement to achieve worldwide recognition as an independent state and accession to the UN. Additionally, Iran is a long-time enemy of Israel and refuses to recognize it as a sovereign state, referring to the Israeli government as a “usurper regime.” The Hamas invasion has been a welcome development for the Iranian government and came at a very convenient time, leading some to speculate that Iran assisted with the planning of the coordinated assault.

Saudi Arabia, chief Gulf rival to Iran, has been shifting closer toward the normalization of relations with Israel. This development would be detrimental to the Iranian agenda, as the deal would likely be brokered by the United States and would bring Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the US closer. The US would finally see its two primary Middle East partners – and Iran’s greatest regional adversaries – enter into diplomatic relations and future cooperation. Recent years have seen other Arab states – especially those with ties to the United States – drift toward Israel, with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan agreeing to normalize relations.

Hamas’s invasion has thrown a massive wrench into the Saudi normalization plans. Saudi Arabia has issued a call for de-escalation in the conflict and has referred to Israeli settlements in Gaza as an illegal occupation in the past. An ongoing war between Israel and Hamas will likely reignite that rhetoric coming from the Saudis and will put normalization talks on hold. At the very least, it will buy Iran more time before Israel and Saudi Arabia establish diplomatic ties and will continue to hamper American efforts in the region.

To the north of Israel in Lebanon, Hezbollah is considering entering the conflict. Also heavily supported by Iran, Hezbollah has been launching rockets into Israel, its sworn enemy, in recent days. Iran supplies Hezbollah with upwards of $700 million per year in funding. In return, Hezbollah has facilitated the transfer of Iranian arms into Syria to support the al-Asad regime. Iran and Hezbollah are closely aligned in their objective to destroy the state of Israel and to remove Western influence from the Middle East.

Hezbollah has the potential to open a second front against Israel should the armed militia choose to invade. The IDF appear to be gearing up for a ground invasion of Gaza, calling up 300,000 reserves in addition to the barrage of air and artillery strikes. Should Israel commit to engaging Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah would be well-positioned to move in from the north, presenting Israel with a two-front war. The only question, however, is whether the Lebanese population would stomach an invasion. Discontent with Hezbollah has risen since its engagement in the Syrian Civil War. Members of the population have felt too much attention has been paid to issues abroad while the Lebanese economy imploded. Lebanese civilians would likely bear the brunt of Israeli retaliation in the form of aerial bombardment in the wake of an invasion. If Hezbollah were to invade, it will have to reckon with a fall in popular support.

Regardless of whether Hezbollah commits to joining Hamas in the war, Iran’s proxies are serving their purpose. Israeli-Saudi diplomacy talks have ground to a halt and the primary source of friction between the two states has been brought back into focus. If Israel and Saudi Arabia are unable to normalize relations, Iran is achieving its goal of disruption.

Additionally, Israel now finds itself in a position where it must launch a massive retaliatory strike to maintain its projection of power in the Middle East. Israel has spent decades building its military to be the force to be feared, and Hamas has already caught it by surprise. If Hamas can weaken Israel, then the perceived impermeability of the Israeli military will be jeopardized, as will Israel’s bargaining power in diplomatic talks with its Arab neighbors.

In a perfect world for Israel (one in which Hezbollah and West Bank Palestinian factions do not enter the war), the ground invasion results in the eradication of Hamas’s command and control apparatus in Gaza and the crippling of its ability to make war. However, Israel would still be presented with a political dilemma of whether it returns full control of Gaza to the Palestinians. The Israeli government will find it difficult to trust Gaza to control its own political environment since Hamas first rose to power in a 2006 election. On the flipside, Israeli occupation or annexation of Gaza will draw intense backlash from its Arab neighbors and prospective regional allies and will make normalization with Saudi Arabia almost a non-starter. In a sense, Israel has been backed into a corner by Iranian proxies where there is no winning solution for it.

Armenia’s parliament has moved further away from its longtime Russian allies, voting to ratify the Rome Statute, and become a state party to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This move comes during the fallout of Azerbaijan’s lightning offensive against ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, which saw the capitulation of the separatist movement and mass exodus of the Armenian population from the enclave. It also saw Russian peacekeeping forces do nothing to help its Armenian allies.

This decision frustrates Russian leadership because President Putin has been indicted by ICC judges on war crimes stemming from the war in Ukraine, issuing warrants for his arrest. As a state party to the Rome Statute, Armenia is now obliged to arrest Putin if he crosses into Armenian territory. However, the Armenian government has extended to Russia a proposal in which Putin would still be able to visit Armenia without fear of arrest. Armenia’s stated primary reasoning for ratifying the Rome Statute is a response to Azerbaijan’s history of aggression and Armenian allegations of war crimes during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, wanting to make it clear that this move is not meant to antagonize Russia.

Regardless of whether Armenia would arrest Putin, this decision signals a strengthening in Armenia’s ties with the West and a further weakening in their relationship with Russia. The lack of Russian intervention in Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh suggested that Armenia cannot and should not rely on Russia for defense. The Collective Security Treaty Organization did not seem to hold any real weight in coming to an ally’s defense or at the very least, helping to resolve the conflict.

Armenia is now faced with an emboldened Azerbaijan following their successful offensive. The departure of tens of thousands of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh will allow for easier governance for Baku and will eventually negate any valid reason for Russian peacekeepers to remain in the area, as they were sent in to deter Azeri incursions into the enclave and protect those who lived there. It is likely that this line of protection for Armenia will soon be no longer.

Additionally, Azerbaijan has signaled a desire to create a land corridor to the Nakhichivan Autonomous Republic, a strip of Azeri territory between Armenia, Türkiye, and Iran. Azerbaijan suggested this corridor would go through Armenia, which opposes the notion. The end goal of this land corridor would be to provide a link between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. These two countries share Turkic cultural and lingual ties.

Armenia, seemingly without the support of its strongest ally, seems to be in a transitionary phase between Russia and the West in search of more promising security and defense guarantees.

The move to the ICC is the latest step in recent months toward Europe and the West. In September, Armenia ran joint military exercises with the United States, drawing a strong rebuke from the Kremlin. Armenia pledged humanitarian aid to Ukraine. France has agreed on contracts to supply Armenia with military equipment. France has also called for the EU to defend the territorial integrity of Armenia.

The shift to the West is Armenia’s only real choice in finding a replacement for Russia in terms of a military alliance. Türkiye is closely allied with Azerbaijan, but Türkiye may be less likely to throw its full support behind Azeri pressure to create a land corridor to the Nakhichivan enclave or a future Azeri incursion into Armenian territory if the Armenians have the backing of NATO allies. The US has a history of imposing sanctions against Turkish entities in response to actions that go against American and NATO foreign policy. If NATO were to lend military support in the form of arms exports or security guarantees, then Türkiye and Azerbaijan may be wary of a Western response to an incursion.

Attempting to gain the favor of the West by antagonizing Russia is a dangerous game for Armenia to play. It currently does not have a viable security partner, and the United States and NATO have no real security interests in Armenia. A country breaking away from the Russian sphere of influence will always be a welcome sight for the Western allies, but a steadfast military alliance in the immediate future seems unlikely with NATO armaments and attention dominated by the war in Ukraine.

More than anything, the recent steps taken toward the West signify to Moscow that Armenia has more choices and that the West has an option to further extend its reach to another country right on the Russian border. Pashinyan may be trying to force Russia’s hand in reaffirming its commitment to its Armenian ally by suggesting it is in Russia’s best interest to remain allied with Armenia. He may also be trying to appeal to the West to gain support against Azerbaijan by shedding the notion that Armenia is a firm ally of Russia, therefore presenting as an ally of the West.

Regardless of intent, Armenia is in an exposed position where its defense capabilities are in limbo. Yerevan is drifting away from a distracted Moscow and reaching out toward a distracted West, while Azerbaijan remains focused on its objectives. The success of Pashinyan’s game relies heavily on now Russia and the West will respond.

Relations between Serbia and Kosovo have shown signs of improvement over the last decade, and steps have been taken toward normalization. With the EU acting as a mediator and NATO providing a peacekeeping force within Kosovo, the two parties have been brought to the table and have produced meaningful resolutions. The Ohrid Agreement of March 2023 was the latest step which guaranteed that Serbia would not prevent Kosovo’s path to EU accession, and vice versa. The Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti hailed this agreement as “de facto recognition” between Kosovo and Serbia. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic denied signing such a deal but has stated that he will support the agreement so long as he does not have to de jure recognize Kosovar independence.

This incremental warming of relations has recently been put on ice. Following a skirmish between Kosovar police forces and heavily armed Serbs last weekend, Serbia has massed armed personnel on its border with Kosovo, and NATO has responded in kind by reinforcing its KFOR peacekeeping mission. There is speculation that Serbia is acting as a proxy for Vladimir Putin and Russia, who may be seeking to destabilize the Balkans in an effort to divert US and NATO attention away from Ukraine.

Serbia and Russia maintain a military alliance, with Serbia being a consumer of Russian military hardware. Russia has backed the Serbian position regarding Kosovo, refusing to recognize Kosovo’s declared independence. Additionally, they share religious and cultural ties, being Eastern Orthodox and Slavic. On the war in Ukraine, however, it has refused to support the Russian invasion and has not recognized Russian annexations of the Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea, citing the necessity to support the territorial integrity of all UN member states. This is a nod at the principles backing its claim over Kosovo, as it is not a UN member state.

Serbia may also be emboldened by Azerbaijan’s recent success in the long-disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. After decades of unresolved conflict, Azerbaijan unilaterally moved to annex the region, removing the ethnic Armenian government resulting in the exodus of Armenian residents from the region. Azerbaijan exercised its military superiority over Armenian forces and moved in after a 24-hour shelling campaign last week. As of now, there has not been much of a blowback from Western powers aside from condemnation, and a stronger response is unlikely.

Serbia may see the lack of consequences and given the contextual parallels, feel it has every right to do the same in Kosovo. However, the presence of NATO troops in Kosovo do pose an obstacle to a potential Serbian invasion. If KFOR forces were to be harmed or put under fire, it is likely that they would respond in kind. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reaffirmed KFOR’s presence and posture today and urged both parties to de-escalate.

Serbia must also weigh its standing with the EU. Hopeful to gain accession, an invasion of Kosovo would go directly against EU efforts over the last 20 years and would set back progress. Much-needed Western aid would also likely be cut off, and it very well may render itself a pariah state in the Balkans. If President Vucic were to take this path, he would be putting Serbia on the side of Vladimir Putin, a relatively weak and distracted ally to have now, as Armenia has discovered.

President Vucic has denied any buildup on the border, reminiscent of Putin’s claim that the 150,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border in 2022 were merely conducting training exercises.

This is a new and developing situation, but there are parallels to current conflicts. It will be interesting to see where President Vucic decides to go from here. Perhaps he is only testing the waters to see if NATO would even pay much mind to a Serbian buildup, or maybe he wants to project strength. One thing is certain – he has brought the attention of the West back to the Balkans. Time will tell what he does with it.

Russia has been a major arms dealer to both Armenia and Azerbaijan following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, placing it in a delicate position in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia has maintained a close military alliance with Russia as a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia has military bases within Armenia’s borders and has guaranteed military support in the event of an attack on Armenia’s territory through Article 4 of the CSTO charter.

Traditionally, Russia has been the most powerful actor in the region with a history of invading its neighbors and projecting its military strength. Russia helped to end the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War by brokering a ceasefire agreement that saw Armenia make concessions to Azerbaijan while placing Russia in a peacekeeping role meant to prevent further Azeri incursions and guarantee safe passage for people and goods.

In the years since the 2020 conflict, Russia has turned itself from a respected power in the ‎region to one weakened by intense war, hefty sanctions, and scrutiny from its allies. Its ‎invasion of Ukraine has weakened its economy in the oil and gas sector as Europe turned away ‎from Russia as a supplier and turned toward alternative options. It has since found other buyers ‎in China, India, and Turkey, but at a lower price than it was selling before February 2022. ‎

Russia has committed massive amounts of personnel and materiel to the war in Ukraine, which ‎has cost it dearly. Casualty estimates as of August 2023 put the Russian dead at 120,000, along ‎with 170,000 to 180,000 injured. According to the Dutch OSINT operation Oryx, the Russian ‎military has lost a combined total of 12,227 vehicles ranging from tanks to infantry fighting ‎vehicles (IFVs) to howitzers. It has failed to achieve air superiority against a far smaller and ‎weaker Ukrainian Air Force. Earlier this month, Vladimir Putin met with Kim Jong-un. Putin is believed to have been seeking ‎out more weaponry to fuel his war that has lasted much longer and cost much more than anyone ‎believed it would have or should have. ‎The war in Ukraine has destroyed the notion that Russia is a strong military state and has ‎sucked up large amounts of its available arsenal and manpower.

Last week, Azerbaijan launched what it called an “anti-terrorist” operation into the disputed region by ‎shelling Nagorno-Karabakh, killing around 200 and forcing ethnic Armenian authorities there ‎to surrender and enter into talks with the Azeri government. Russian peacekeeping forces ‎Nagorno-Karabakh did nothing to support and defend its close ally, allowing Azerbaijan to roll ‎over any resistance in the area with relative ease. ‎

The lack of a substantial reaction from Russian forces suggests that Russia is either unwilling ‎or unable to mount any sort of meaningful response. Its war in Ukraine is eating up massive ‎amounts of manpower, money, and military supplies. Barely supporting its own war effort, it ‎will likely not go to extreme lengths to support Armenia’s. ‎

Furthermore, the wife of Armenian Prime Minister, Anna Hakobyan, met with President ‎Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his wife earlier this month. This meeting will further widen the ‎growing gap between Armenia and Russia. Putin has yet to acknowledge that Zelenskyy is the ‎leader of a sovereign state. Armenia meeting with Zelenskyy and providing aid will likely further ‎distance Armenia from Russia, creating a weakness in Armenia’s security policy. If it cannot ‎rely on Russia to provide military support and security guarantees promised by Article 4 of the ‎CSTO, then it will become vulnerable to further Azeri advances into Armenian claims in Nagorno-Karabakh.‎

Azerbaijan has been economically strengthened by the European bloc’s shift away from ‎Russian gas and oil. It has enjoyed a significant rise in gas exports since 2021 and has pledged ‎to double gas flows to the EU by 2027. This pledge, however, is hampered by domestic demand ‎and its current capacity to transport gas exports to the EU. Azerbaijan will need to increase ‎production and exploit new gas fields in the Caspian Sea. If it does so and follows through on ‎the deal struck with the EU, it will ultimately be responsible for the supply of 18% the EU’s ‎overall natural gas consumption, making Azerbaijan a crucial energy provider for the future. ‎

Azerbaijan is finding itself in a position where it is growing closer with the European bloc ‎and is free of Russian interference in Nagorno-Karabakh. It will be ‎interesting, however, to see how aggressive Azerbaijan is in its pursuit of total dominion over ‎Nagorno-Karabakh. Its recent attack drew the ire of the European Parliament, with some MEPs proposing sanctions be ‎levied against Azerbaijan in response. Azeri President Ilham Aliyev may need to find a balance ‎between not forcing the hand of the EU to suspend the deal or to place sanctions against the ‎country while still satisfying the domestic calls for the takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh. ‎

If Aliyev manages to find that balance and strike a perfect tune with both the Europeans and his ‎constituents, then Azerbaijan could find itself in a new-found seat of power where it ‎straddles the geopolitical boundary between West and East, able to implement its regional ‎agenda while remaining in the relative good graces of its European consumers. ‎

The waning Russian presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia means the legitimacy of the CSTO is now called into question. Armenia and Russia, ‎once tied at the hip are now drifting apart. Article 4 was activated by Armenia in 2022, and no other ‎member-states came to their aid. CSTO members Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan exchanged fire in ‎a September 2022 border clash that caused civilian deaths. Member-state Kazakhstan has ‎attempted to walk a diplomatic tightrope between Russia and Ukraine, calling for peace while ‎stopping short of open criticism of Putin and Russia. ‎

Azerbaijan’s latest encroachment on Armenian claims without consequences coming from ‎Russia may prompt Kazakhstan to openly criticize its longtime ally. Tajikistan and ‎Kyrgyzstan may realize Russia is no longer hanging above them waiting to knock their ‎heads together if they re-engage in a territorial dispute. The Russian-led CSTO may be ‎crumbling as Russia becomes a weaker and more distracted regional power, opening the ‎door for new powers to establish themselves, with none in a better position than Azerbaijan.

Truthfully, they are doing their best. Ukraine is a nation of 44 million to Russia’s 144 million. Vladimir Putin – following in the footsteps of his Soviet predecessors – has shown no qualms in throwing bodies at a city or village until it is taken. The Ukrainians are outmanned, not in quality but quantity. Each Ukrainian casualty is proportionally more significant than each Russian. Should the war become one of attrition, the numbers heavily favor Russia. Ukrainian forces must be strategic in their advance and cannot be reckless with the deployment of their soldiers, so this counteroffensive will not be quick. However, victory must of course be achieved as quickly as possible. For this to be done, the US and NATO must provide Ukraine with all aid requested.

The Biden administration has repeatedly balked at sending certain weapons and vehicles for various reasons, but mainly out of concern of Putin’s response. President Biden does not want Western weapons being used to attack Russian territory, and as such first focused on providing defensive armaments. Such a concern is reasonable when dealing with a reasonable individual, but Putin is far from that. He is a man who truly believes the Russian Federation is destined to return to the Russian Empire. He already views Ukraine as Russian territory that he must take back. The 2014 annexation of Crimea was motivated by this ideology, along with general discontent over the original transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine in 1954 under Nikita Khrushchev. Such a mentality pokes a hole in the qualification that weapons supplied must be used only within Ukrainian borders when Putin does not recognize said borders.

Apparent handwringing about Putin’s potential escalation in response to increased lethal aid led to repeated American and Western refusals of Ukrainian requests for tanks, jets, and air defense systems, only to later relent and provide the much-needed hardware. These delays needlessly prolonged the war and put the Ukrainian position at risk, such as earlier this summer when Ukraine found its supply of artillery shells dwindling. It had long been requesting cluster munitions along with conventional high explosive shells, which the US had been reluctant to provide due to the considerable risk it poses to the civilian population and pressure from allies to refrain. However, the Biden administration’s hand was forced as American production of conventional shells could not keep up with Ukrainian demand. Cluster munitions filled the gap. Time is clearly of the essence to prevent a war of attrition and to avoid a scenario where Ukrainian forces are running out of ammunition.

President Zelenskyy has repeatedly stated that victory for Ukraine is only to come upon the expulsion of Russian occupiers from all of Ukraine’s territory, including Crimea. He is calling for a decisive rout of Putin’s forces – a victory so lopsided that the Russian president would willingly come to the negotiating table and would not dare consider staying in the war. This is not achievable through half-measures and a trickling stream of military supplies.

The United States and NATO have most certainly committed large amounts of materiel and have pledged hefty financial assistance. I am not overlooking these actions. However, this has all been just enough for Ukraine to not lose, to stay in the fight. One of the most effective ways for a warring party to exercise its strength without substantial opposing force is to achieve air superiority. Russia has failed to achieve this, in part to the effective Ukrainian air defenses (supplied by the Western alliance) and Russian ineptitude. As Ukrainian troops continue their advance into Russian-occupied territory, they will become more vulnerable to Russian artillery, armor, and aircraft. With air superiority, Ukrainian infantry would be able to advance without having to be as concerned about Russian artillery and bunkers as they would be weakened by Ukrainian aerial assaults. If the United States agreed to supply the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s back in December (in a perfect world, sooner) then the counteroffensive might be taking on a different shape with a much sharper Ukrainian edge. The same could be said for the M1A1 Abrams tank (announced to be supplied in March of this year). Such weaponry could provide Ukraine with a decisive upper hand in uprooting fixed Russian positions along the front.

The Russians are throwing bodies at the frontline with little discrimination for who will be sent to war, reinstituting mass mobilizations. Ukraine does not have the luxury of human cannon fodder, but it does have the arsenal of the West. This arsenal must be utilized. The US and NATO should answer wave after wave of mobilized Russians with wave after wave of shipments of modern weaponry, vehicles, and supplies to not only keep Ukraine in the fight, but to give it the strength of a first-class military to place Russia on the defensive. Send the jets, the tanks, the artillery. Vladimir Putin is a strongman who will only respond to overwhelming strength. Appeasement or hoping for a negotiated ceasefire is unsustainable and an impermanent solution.

Of course, no weaponry is transferred instantaneously, and nothing can be done to wave a magic wand and end the war in victory. Soldiers and airmen must be trained on these Western machines, and that takes months to complete. I am not of the impression that if the jets and tanks had been given to Ukraine last year that the war would be over now with Russia at its knees. But, as previously stated, time is of the essence in this war for Ukraine. The repeated delays were unnecessary and hampered the overall war effort. It is my hope that the Biden administration and NATO have learned from these previous examples and will not only continue to provide aid, but at a much higher rate. If Ukraine is to land a decisive blow in the coming months against the seemingly endless pit of Russian manpower, it must be done with the help of overwhelming firepower and decisive military superiority.

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